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Abstract
Motivated by sponsored search auctions, we study multi-unit auctions with budget
constraints. In the mechanism we propose, Sort-Cut, understating budgets or values
is weakly dominated. Since Sort-Cut’s revenue is increasing in budgets and values,
all kinds of equilibrium deviations from true valuations turn out to be beneficial to
the auctioneer. We show that the revenue of Sort-Cut can be an order of magnitude
greater than that of the natural Market Clearing Price mechanism, and we discuss the
efficiency properties of its ex-post Nash equilibrium.
Keywords: Multi-Unit Auctions, Budget Constraints, Sponsored Search
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1 Introduction
Consider the advertisement department of a computer manufacturer, who wants to appear in
a particular Web search engine’s query for “laptops.” Search engines use complicated rules
to determine the allocation1 of these advertisements, or “sponsored links,” and also their
∗We thank NSF (SES 0752931) and Google Research for support. We also thank seminar participants in
Google Research and Microsoft Research for useful comments.
†Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA. E-mails:
ssayedir@cmu.edu, isaemin@cmu.edu, ravi@cmu.edu
1By allocations, we mean which advertisements will be displayed, and in which order they will be displayed
if there is more than one.
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pricing rules. Roughly, the advertisers specify “a value per click” and a daily maximum
budget. Allocation and pricing is then determined by a complex algorithm that makes sure
that the advertisers are not charged more, per click, than their stated values and also are
not charged more than their total budget per day.
Advertisers’ true (estimated) values per click and daily budgets are, of course, their
private own information, and given any allocation and pricing rule they will act strategically
in bidding their values and budgets. It is then natural to ask whether there is any mechanism
in which the participants would prefer to reveal their types truthfully: in this model, their
per click values and daily budgets. Then there will not be any “gaming” of the mechanism
and socially efficient allocations can be implemented. Second-price auctions in single-unit
auction problems and different versions of Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanisms in more general
setups have been very successful in implementing socially efficient allocations in “dominant
strategies.” Unfortunately, a recent impossibility result (Dobzinski et al. 2008) precludes the
existence of a truthful mechanism with Pareto-optimal allocations in this important setting.
In this paper, we propose a mechanism–Sort-Cut–which yields good revenue and Pareto
optimality properties. In our mechanism, understating budgets or values is weakly dom-
inated. Thus the only way a bidder can possibly benefit from lying in our mechanism is
by overstating her values or budgets. We also show that the revenue of Sort-Cut is non-
decreasing in budgets and values, which in turn yields high revenue for the auctioneer at
equilibria.
The idea of Sort-Cut is very similar to the idea of a second-price auction. In second-price
auctions without budget constraints, the highest bidder is allocated the object and pays the
highest loser’s bid to the auctioneer. Uniform-price auctions generalize this idea to multi-
unit auctions. The idea is to charge the winners the opportunity cost: the losers’ bids. When
the bidders have budget constraints, however, losers might not be able to buy all the items
if offered: they might simply not be able to afford it. Taking this into account, we modify
the algorithm to charge the winners, per item, the value of the highest-value loser, but only
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up to this loser’s budget. After the highest-value loser’s budget is exhausted, she would
not be able to afford any more items, so we start charging the winners the second-highest
loser’s value, up to her budget and so on. Given this pricing idea,2 the winners and losers
are determined via a cut-point to clear the market, i.e. all the available items are sold.
Sort-Cut has a number of desirable properties. First of all, it sells all the items so there
is no inefficiency in that sense (whereas Borgs et al. 2005 and Goldberg et al. 2001 might
leave some of the items unallocated). Second, bidders can only benefit by overstating their
values or budgets, a deviation that is the most desirable for the auctioneer. Third, allocation
in the equilibrium of Sort-cut is nearly Pareto optimal in the sense that all winners’ values
are greater than the cut-point bidder’s announced value, and all losers’ values are smaller
than the cut-point bidder’s announced value. And lastly, Sort-Cut reduces to a second-price
auction when there are no budget constraints.3
We show that the revenue of Sort-cut differs at most by the budget of one bidder from the
revenue of the “market clearing price mechanism.” The market clearing mechanism deter-
mines a market clearing price and sells all the units for that price. This mechanism, however,
is not truthful, and the bidders can benefit from understating their budgets (thereby decreas-
ing the auctioneer’s revenue).
After discussing the related literature below, we introduce the model and our mechanism
in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the truthfulness, revenue, and Pareto optimality properties
of Sort-Cut. Section 4 compares the market clearing price mechanism with Sort-Cut. Finally,
Section 5 discusses possible extensions of the current model.
2There is a caveat here, which is that the lowest-value winner might not be able to exhaust all of her
budget. Then all higher-value bidders are charged first at the lowest-value winner’s value up to her unused
budget. This makes sense as the lowest-value winner is still a competitor with other winners to buy further
items. The pricing for the lowest-value winner, for the same reason, starts from the highest-value loser. She
cannot be a competitor with herself.
3Generalized second-price auctions studied by Edelman et al. (2007) also has a similar idea in multi-item
auctions. In that mechanism the winner of the best item (first sponsored link) is charged the bid of the
second-best item, the winner of the second-best item is charged the bid of the third-best item, and so on.
In this environment there are no budget constraints and the second-highest bid is always the competitor of
the highest value.
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Related Literature The problem of multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bid-
ders was initiated by Borgs et al. (2005). Our model is similar to theirs except that we
need not assume that utility is −∞ when budget constraints are violated. They introduce a
truthful mechanism that extracts a constant fraction of the optimal revenue asymptotically;
however, their mechanism may leave some units unsold. The idea is to group the people
randomly into two groups, and use the market clearing price of each group as a posted price
for the other group. Another paper that uses the same model is by Abrams (2006), which
uses techniques similar to Borgs et al. (2005) but improves upon them; however, it may still
leave some units unsold.
In an important paper, Dobzinski et al. (2008) prove an impossibility result. They
first assume that the budgets of all players are publicly known, and under this assumption,
they present a truthful mechanism that is individually rational and Pareto-optimal. Their
mechanism essentially applies Ausubel’s multi-unit auction (Ausubel 2004) to this budgeted
setting. Then they show that their mechanism is the unique mechanism that is both truthful
and Pareto-optimal under the assumption of publicly known budgets. Finally, by showing
that their mechanism is not truthful if budgets are private knowledge, they conclude that
no mechanism for this problem can be individual rational, truthful, and Pareto-optimal.
Bhattacharya et al. (2010a) show that although the mechanism proposed for public
budgets in Dobzinski et al. (2008) is not truthful, for lying to be beneficial the bidder must
overstate her budget (value may be overstated or understated). This, together with the fact
that the utility of a bidder who is charged more than her budget is −∞, allows them to
modify the non-truthful deterministic mechanism into a truthful randomized mechanism.
For each bidder, instead of charging her the price specified by Dobzinski et al. (2008), they
run a lottery (with appropriate probability) and charge her either 0, or all of her announced
budget. Therefore, since a bidder has to pay all of her announced budget with positive
probability, the expected utility of over stating the budget becomes −∞. The assumption of
the utility being −∞ when the budget constraints are violated does not seem very realistic.
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In our work, we drop that assumption by assuming that the utility of bidder who has to
pay more than her budget is an arbitrary negative value. Furthermore, we avoid randomized
pricing and allocation to guarantee ex-post individual rationality.
Ashlagi et al. (2010) look at budget constraints in position auctions; in their setting,
bidders must be matched to slots where each slot corresponds to a certain fraction of the
total supply. Bidders are profit maximizers who face budget constraints. They assume
that a violation of budget constraints leads to zero utility for the bidder. They propose a
modification of the Generalized Second Price mechanism that is Pareto-optimal and envy
free. In their setting, the fraction of supply on each of the slots is fixed; this makes their
problem more like a matching problem with a discrete structure. However, in our setting,
the auctioneer has complete freedom regarding how much of the supply to give to each of
the bidders.
Other papers have studied budget constraints in mechanism design, but in settings quite
different from ours. Feldman et al. (2008) give a truthful mechanism for ad auctions with
budget-constrained advertisers where there are multiple slots available for each query, and an
advertiser cannot appear in more than one slot per query. They define advertisers to be click-
maximizers; i.e. advertisers do not value their unused budget, they just want to maximize
the amount of supply they get. However, in our model, advertisers are profit-maximizers.
Pai and Vohra (2010) look at optimal auctions with budget constraints. In their setting,
there is one indivisible good to be allocated, making the setting naturally different from ours.
Moreover, they assume −∞ utility if budget constraints are violated. In another paper,
Malakhov and Vohra (2008) look at the divisible case; however, they assume that there are
only two bidders, one of whom has no budget constraints while the budget constraint of
the other one is publicly known. Kempe et al. (2009) look at budget constraints when the
bidders have single-unit demand and items are heterogenous. Bhattacharya et al. (2010b)
show that a sequential posted price can achieve a constant fraction of the optimal revenue
in a budgeted setting with heterogeneous items when the budgets are common knowledge.
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Both Borgs et al. (2005) and Dobzinski et al. (2008) argue that lack of quasi-linearity
(because of hard budget constraints) is the most important difficulty of the problem. Still,
some papers have tried to solve the problem by relaxing the hard budget constraints (Maskin
2000), or by modeling the budget constraint as an upper bound on the value obtained by the
bidder rather than her payment (Mehta et al. 2007). It has also been shown (Borgs et al.
2005) that modeling budget constraints with quasi-linear functions can lead to arbitrarily
low revenue.
Benoit and Krishna (2001) study an auction for selling two single items to budget-
constrained bidders. They focus mainly on the effect of bidding aggressively on an unwanted
item with the purpose of depleting the other bidder’s budget. A similar effect arises in our
model, but the focus of our work is generally very different from theirs. Another paper is
that by Che and Gale (1996), which compares first-price and all-pay auctions in a budget-
constrained setting and shows that the expected payoff of all-pay auctions is better under
certain assumptions. However, they do not consider multi-unit items.
2 The Model and Sort-Cut
There are m divisible units of a good for sale. There are n bidders with a linear demand
up to their budget limits. Specifically, each bidder i ∈ N = {1, ..., n} has a two-dimensional
type (bi, vi) where bi denotes her budget limit and vi denotes her private value. Bidder i’s
utility by getting q (possible fractional) units of the good and paying p is given by
ui (q, p) =


qvi − p if p ≤ bi
−C if p > bi
where ∞ ≥ C > 0.
We are interested in mechanisms to sell m units to n bidders which have good incentive,
efficiency, and revenue properties. The equilibrium concept we use is that of an ex-post Nash
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equilibrium. In an ex-post Nash equilibrium, no bidder wants to deviate after she observes
all other players’ strategies. We believe that this is an appropriate equilibrium concept, as
we are motivated by sponsored search auctions. Typically, sponsored search auctions are
dynamic auctions; and bids can be changed at any time. Therefore, it is reasonable that
in a stable situation (steady state), no bidder will want to deviate even after the bids are
revealed. Since the equilibrium concept is ex-post Nash, we do not need to assume strong
conditions on private information. Specifically, we can allow for interdependency in two
dimensional type within or across bidders.
We focus on direct mechanisms in which bidders announce their types (values and bud-
gets). A mechanism consists of an allocation rule (how many units to allocate to each bidder)
and a pricing rule (how much to charge each bidder). It takes the announcements as inputs
and produces an allocation and a pricing scheme as an output. We consider mechanisms
that satisfy two properties: (i) it must sell all m units, and (ii) it must satisfy individual
rationality constraints (i.e. all bidders prefer to participate in the mechanism). Note that
the latter condition implies that bidders who are not allocated any units (losers) cannot be
charged a positive price. Bidders who are allocated nonzero units (winners), however, will
be charged a positive price. Let us first introduce a general and an abstract pricing rule.
Definition 1 The price is set according to a pricing function α : R+ → R+, if the marginal
price of the next unit is α (y) dollars for a buyer who has already spent y dollars in the
market. In other words, if the pricing of an item is set according to α, a buyer with b dollars
can afford
x (α, b) =
∫ b
0
1
α (y)
dy
units of the item. We are interested in pricing rules α (·) that are nonincreasing and positive.
Hence, we assume α (y) ≤ α (y′) for all y ≥ y′ and also α (y) > 0 for all y.
The following definition is also convenient for later discussions.
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Definition 2 (Shifted pricing) For a given pricing function α and a positive real number z,
we define the pricing function αz (y) as:
αz (y) = α (z + y) .
Less formally, αz (y) is the pricing function obtained by shifting α (y) , z units to right.
Note that we have, for any z ∈ [0, b] ,
x (α, b) = x (α, z) + x (αz, b− z) .
Throughout the proofs of our results, we sometimes make use of the terms “better (or
worse) pricing function” and “getting to lower prices.” We say that α is a better pricing
function than α′ for a bidder if α (y) ≤ α′ (y) for all y. We say that α gets to lower prices
than α′ for a bidder with budget b if marginal payment at b is lower with α than with α′.
We are now ready to introduce a special class of pricing and allocation rules, which we
name Procedure Cut.
Definition 3 Procedure Cut takes budgets and values of the bidders (b,v) ∈ Rn++×R
n
++, a
pricing rule α (·) , and a real number c ∈ (0,
∑n
i=1 bi] as input. First, it sorts bid and value
vectors (b,v) in nonascending4 order of values and reindexes them so that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ... ≥
vn.
5 Then, it picks j such that c ≤
∑j
i=1 bi and c >
∑j−1
i=1 bi. Let s =
∑j
i=1 bi − c. Procedure
Cut sets the pricing function of bidders 1, ..., j− 1 to αc and the pricing function of bidder j
to αc+s. The allocation of each bidder 1, .., j − 1 is such that she spends all her budget, i.e.
xi = x (α
c, bi) for i = 1, .., j − 1. The allocation of bidder j is such that she spends bj − s
of her budget, i.e. xj = x (α
c+s, bj − s) . Bidder j’s unused budget is denoted by s, where
s ∈ [0, bj). All bidders j + 1, ..., n get no allocation and pay nothing.
4It breaks ties among equal valued bidders arbitrarily.
5Note that after reindexing, budgets are not necessarily sorted in a descending way. A bidder with a high
valuation could have a small budget.
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DefineX (c, (b,v)) to be the total number of units allocated to all bidders, i.e. X (c, (b,v)) =
∑j
i=1 xi. Bidders 1, ..., j are called full winners, bidder j is called a partial winner (or a cut-
point bidder), and bidders j + 1, ..., n are called losers.
We consider pricing rules that are not too high, in the sense that they will be able to sell
all the items if all budgets are exhausted. Hence we assume that for B ≡
∑n
i=1 bi
α (B) ≤
B
m
.
With this assumption, we can easily conclude that X (B, (b,v)) ≥ m. This is because when
c = B, all bidders are full winners and their allocations satisfy
x
(
αB, bi
)
≥
bi
∑n
i=1 bi
m
and hence
X (B, (b,v)) =
∑n
i=1
x
(
αB, bi
)
≥ m
We are interested in rules that sell m units. In the following proposition, we show that
for any procedure cut rule, X (c, (b,v)) is strictly increasing and continuous in c. Together
with the assumption that X (
∑n
i=1 bi, (b,v)) ≥ m, this will imply that there will be a unique
c such that X (c, (b,v)) = m.
Proposition 1 X (c, (b,v)) is strictly increasing and continuous in c.
Proof. In the Appendix.
As noted above, an important corollary of Proposition 1 is that there will be a unique c∗
that will satisfy X (c∗, (b,v)) = m.
Definition 4 We call the unique c∗ with X (c∗, (b,v)) = m to be the cut-point. Given
pricing function α (·) and vectors (b,v) , we name Procedure Cut that sells m items (with
c = c∗) to be the m-Procedure Cut.
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We now can introduce our new mechanism that we call the Sort-Cut Mechanism.
Definition 5 Sort-Cut is a m-Procedure Cut mechanism in which α (·) is a step function
defined by (reindexed) (b,v): α (y) = vi for y ∈ (
∑i−1
k=1 bk,
∑i
k=1 bk].
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In other words, Sort-Cut takes the vectors (b,v) and sorts them in nonascending order
of values, calculates the unique cut-point c∗ according to the pricing function that each full
winner (bidders 1, .., j − 1) pays vj per unit up to a budget of s, then pays vj+1 per unit up
to a budget of bj+1, then pays vj+2 per unit up to a budget of bj+2, and so on, until their
budgets are exhausted; the partial winner (bidder j) pays vj+1 per unit up to a budget of
bj+1, then pays vj+2 per unit up to a budget of bj+2, and so on, until she spends bj − s.
Let us the denote the Sort-Cut revenue by RS (b,v) (Note that RS (b,v) = c∗ where
X (c∗, (b,v)) = m). Next, we show that the revenue of Sort-Cut is nondecreasing in the
budget and value announcements of the bidders.
Proposition 2 RS (b,v) is nondecreasing in b and v.
Proof. In the Appendix.
3 Truthfulness, Revenue, and Near Pareto Optimality
3.1 Truthfulness
In this section, we show that Sort-Cut has good incentive properties. More specifically, we
show that no bidder benefits from understating her value or budget. First we argue that
three deviations that understate value or budget or both are weakly dominated in ex-post
equilibria. Then we consider two other deviations that might potentially decrease revenue
and argue that either they are not reasonable or they result in higher revenue.
6And also α (y) = ε > 0 for y ∈ (B,∞)
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Proposition 3 For any bidder i with types (bi, vi) , bidding (bi, vi) weakly dominates bidding(
bi, v
−
i
)
for v−i < vi.
Proof. Consider any (b−i,v−i) . First of all, if i becomes a loser by bidding
(
bi, v
−
i
)
, her
utility cannot increase with this deviation. This is because losers’ utilities are zero, and by
construction, a bidder with type (bi, vi) achieves a nonnegative utility by bidding (bi, vi) . We
will look at the possible cases one by one.
• If i is a loser by bidding (bi, vi) , then she will be a loser by bidding
(
bi, v
−
i
)
(since the
pricing function gets better for the winners). Hence her utility cannot increase by this
deviation.
• If i is a partial winner by bidding (bi, vi) and bidding
(
bi, v
−
i
)
makes her a partial
winner, then she will have the same pricing function but she will be able to use less
of her budget (since the pricing function for full winners becomes better); hence her
utility cannot increase. Bidder i cannot become a winner by bidding
(
bi, v
−
i
)
, when
she is a partial winner by bidding (bi, vi).
• If i is a winner by bidding (bi, vi) and bidding
(
bi, v
−
i
)
makes her a winner, her utility
does not change. This is because Sort-cut pricing ignores the value of winners in the
pricing calculation. If i is a winner by bidding (bi, vi) and bidding
(
bi, v
−
i
)
makes her
a partial winner, then the original partial winner j (with an unused budget s) has to
be a winner after the deviation. We argue that i’s utility decreases. It is true that i
would get the items at a lower per-unit price after the deviation, but at the same time
she is using less of her budget. The argument is that, by this deviation i cannot get
to lower-priced items, and this follows from the fact that revenue of Sort-cut cannot
decrease after the deviation. More formally, let us denote the unused budget of i after
the deviation by s′. We know that s′ ≥ s (because revenue cannot increase). Bidder
i’s utility difference with the deviation can be shown to be nonpositive (where α and
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c are defined with respect to (b,v))
(
x
(
αc+s, bi − s
′
)
vi − (bi − s
′)
)
− (x (αc, bi) vi − bi)
=
(
x
(
αc+s, bi − s
′
)
− x (αc, bi)
)
vi + s
′
≤
(
x
(
αc+s
′
, bi − s
′
)
− x (αc, bi)
)
vi + s
′
=
(
x
(
αc+s
′
, bi − s
′
)
−
(
x (αc, s′) + x
(
αc+s
′
, bi − s
′
)))
vi + s
′
= s′ − x (αc, s′) vi
≤ s′ −
s′
vi
vi
= 0
where the first inequality follows from s′ ≥ s and the second inequality follows from
αc (y) ≤ vi.
Proposition 4 For any bidder i with type (bi, vi), bidding (bi, vi) weakly dominates bidding(
b−i , vi
)
for b−i < bi.
Proof. Consider any (b−i,v−i): First of all, as in the previous proof, if i becomes a loser
by bidding
(
b−i , vi
)
, her utility cannot increase with this deviation. We look at the possible
cases one by one.
• If i is a loser by bidding (bi, vi) , then she will be a loser by bidding
(
b−i , vi
)
(since the
pricing function gets better for the winners).
• If i is a partial winner by bidding (bi, vi) and bidding
(
b−i , vi
)
makes her a partial
winner, then she will have the same pricing function but will be able to use less of
her budget (since the pricing function for winners becomes better), hence her utility
cannot increase. Bidder i cannot become a winner by bidding
(
bi, v
−
i
)
, when she is a
partial winner by bidding (bi, vi).
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• If i is a winner by bidding (bi, vi) and bidding
(
b−i , vi
)
makes her a partial winner,
then i would be worse off with this deviation. This is because (i) she is using less of
her budget, and (ii) her pricing got worse. If i is a full winner by bidding (bi, vi) and
bidding
(
b−i , vi
)
leaves her a full winner, we can argue that her utility decreases. It is
true that i may get the items at a lower per-unit price after the deviation, but at the
same time she is using less of her budget. The argument is that by this deviation i
cannot get to lower-priced items, which follows from the fact that the revenue of Sort-
cut cannot increase after the deviation. More formally, bidder i’s utility difference with
the deviation can be shown to be nonpositive as follows. Here α and c are defined with
respect to (b,v) and c′ (≤ c) is the Sort-cut revenue after deviation.
(
x
(
αc
′+bi−b
−
i , b−i
)
vi − b
−
i
)
− (x (αc, bi) vi − bi)
=
(
x
(
αc
′+bi−b
−
i , b−i
)
− x (αc, bi)
)
vi + bi − b
−
i
≤
(
x
(
αc+bi−b
−
i , b−i
)
− x (αc, bi)
)
vi + bi − b
−
i
=
(
x
(
αc+bi−b
−
i , b−i
)
−
(
x
(
αc, bi − b
−
i
)
+ x
(
αc+bi−b
−
i , b−i
)))
vi + bi − b
−
i
= bi − b
−
i − x
(
αc, bi − b
−
i
)
vi
≤ bi − b
−
i −
bi − b
−
i
vi
vi
= 0
where the first inequality follows from c ≥ c′ and the second inequality follows from
αc (y) ≤ vi for all y.
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Similarly, we can argue that bidding
(
b−i , v
−
i
)
for b−i < bi and v
′
i < v
−
i is weakly dominated
by bidding (bi, vi) . This follows from the proofs above. The two previous propositions imply
7To see why bidder i’s pricing after the deviation is according to αc
′
+bi−b
−
i , note that her pricing is
according to αc
′
according to types after the deviation, and this translates to αc
′
+bi−b
−
i with the original
types.
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that both
(
b−i , vi
)
and
(
bi, v
−
i
)
dominate
(
b−i , v
−
i
)
when b−i < bi and v
−
i < vi. Applying either
of them one more time, we have the following result.
Proposition 5 For any bidder i with type (bi, vi) , bidding (bi, vi) weakly dominates bidding(
b−i , v
−
i
)
for b−i < bi and v
−
i < vi.
Propositions 3, 4, and 5 establish that these-revenue decreasing deviations should not
occur in equilibrium (they are weakly dominated). There are two deviations, however, that
may increase or decrease the revenue. These deviations are “understating budget and over-
stating value” and “overstating budget and understating value.” We now show that the
former deviation is not reasonable in the sense that it could be a best response only when
the utility with that strategy is zero. Then we show that the latter deviation could happen
in equilibrium, yet whenever it is a (strict) profitable deviation from truthful revelation, the
revenue increases with the deviation.
Proposition 6 For any bidder i with type (bi, vi) , for b
−
i < bi and v
+
i > vi, bidding
(
b−i , v
+
i
)
can never be in the set of best responses unless bidder i’s utility in her best response is 0.
Proof. Given (b−i,v−i) , suppose that
(
b−i , v
+
i
)
is a best response for i where b−i < bi and
v+i > vi. Since bidding (bi, vi) would give nonnegative utility to bidder i, the utility by bidding(
b−i , v
+
i
)
has to be nonnegative. We claim that bidding
(
bi, v
+
i
)
is a better response than
(
b−i , v
+
i
)
, and it is strictly better when the utility by bidding
(
bi, v
+
i
)
is strictly positive. This
implies
(
b−i , v
+
i
)
could be a best response only when bidder i’s utility in her best response is
0.
Suppose that utility by bidding
(
b−i , v
+
i
)
is nonnegative, and consider the utility difference
between bidding
(
b−i , v
+
i
)
versus bidding
(
bi, v
+
i
)
. The utility difference is clearly zero if i is a
loser in both cases. For all other cases, i would be either a partial winner or a full winner by
bidding
(
bi, v
+
i
)
. Then, we could see that bidding
(
bi, v
+
i
)
gives a higher utility than bidding
(
b−i , v
+
i
)
. The argument is the same as in the proof for Proposition 4: by bidding an extra
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budget of bi−b
−
i bidder i can get extra items at a per-unit price lower than her value, leading
to a nonzero increase in her utility.
In other words, we should not expect to see
(
b−i , v
+
i
)
to be played, since it is worse than
either (bi, vi) or
(
bi, v
+
i
)
.
Proposition 7 For any bidder i with type (bi, vi) , for b
+
i > bi and v
−
i < vi, whenever
bidding
(
b+i , v
−
i
)
brings a higher utility to i than bidding (bi, vi) , the auctioneer’s revenue
with
(
b+i , v
−
i
)
is not lower than the revenue with (bi, vi) .
Proof. Given (b−i,v−i) , for some b
+
i > bi and v
−
i < vi, suppose that ui
((
b−i, b
+
i
)
,
(
v−i, v
−
i
))
>
ui ((b−i, bi) , (v−i, vi)) . Since bidder i is budget constrained, she will have to be a partial win-
ner by bidding
(
b+i , v
−
i
)
(if she is a full winner her utility would be −C, and if she is a loser
her utility would be 0).
• If she is a loser by bidding (bi, vi) , the auctioneer’s revenue clearly increases with(
b+i , v
−
i
)
. This is because i’s ranking with v−i is not higher than with vi, and so by
deviating from (bi, vi) to
(
b+i , v
−
i
)
, all full winners remain full winners and i becomes
a partial winner.
• If she is a full winner by bidding (bi, vi) , the partial winner with (bi, vi) has to become
a full winner after i deviates to
(
b+i , v
−
i
)
. Otherwise, i would be worse off by bidding
(
b+i , v
−
i
)
as she will have a worse pricing function. In this case the revenue has to
increase. The argument is that, for this deviation to be beneficial, i has to get lower
priced items after the deviation. For this to be the case, the partial winner’s unused
budget before the deviation, plus i’s used budget after the deviation, has to be greater
than i’s budget bi. But in this case, the revenue increases, since the new cut point is
greater than the old one.
• If she is a partial winner by bidding (bi, vi) , we need to analyze two cases: (i) i’s ranking
among the bidders is the same, or (ii) i’s ranking is different. For (i), the pricing for
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(bi, vi) and
(
b+i , v
−
i
)
are the same. Since utility with
(
b+i , v
−
i
)
is more than utility with
(bi, vi) , this means i is using more of her budget with
(
b+i , v
−
i
)
. Therefore the revenue
increases. For (ii), i’s ranking has to be worse with
(
b+i , v
−
i
)
. Now, similar to the
previous case, we argue that total budget of “new full winners” after the deviation
plus the used budget of i after deviation has to be greater than bi. If that is not the
case, i cannot get to lower prices.
In the above propositions we argued that playing
(
b−i , vi
)
,
(
bi, v
−
i
)
and
(
b−i , v
−
i
)
are not
reasonable (they are dominated by (bi, vi)); playing
(
b−i , v
+
i
)
is not reasonable in a weaker
sense (it is dominated by a combination of (bi, vi) and
(
bi, v
+
i
)
); also, playing
(
b+i , v
−
i
)
is
reasonable only when it is done by a winner, who becomes a partial winner after deviation
and increases the overall revenue. We call the equilibria in which the strategies satisfy these
conditions a refined equilibrium.
Definition 6 A refined equilibrium is an equilibrium of Sort-Cut where for all bidders i,
bidder i does not play
(
b−i , vi
)
,
(
bi, v
−
i
)
,
(
b−i , v
−
i
)
, or
(
b−i , v
+
i
)
. Moreover, a bidder i plays
(
b+i , v
−
i
)
only when ui
((
b−i, b
+
i
)
,
(
v−i, v
−
i
))
> ui ((b−i, bi) , (v−i, vi)) .
The refined equilibrium refinement of Sort-Cut’s ex-post Nash equilibria is in the spirit
of refinement of considering weakly undominated strategies: (b−, v), (b, v−) , and (b−, v−) are
weakly dominated; (b−, v+) is dominated by a combination of two strategies; and our refine-
ment requires (b+, v−) to be played when it is better than (b, v) . In a refined equilibrium,
bidders never understate their budgets, and they understate their values only when they
also simultaneously overstate their budgets, making them better off than their truthful an-
nouncements. Recall that when ui
((
b−i, b
+
i
)
,
(
v−i, v
−
i
))
> ui ((b−i, bi) , (v−i, vi)) ,
(
b+i , v
−
i
)
makes i a partial winner after the deviation and revenue is higher with
(
b+i , v
−
i
)
than with
(bi, vi).
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3.2 Revenue
There are eight possible kinds of deviations from truthful revelation, (bi, vi) . Five of them are
discussed in the definition of refined equilibrium, and the remaining three of them, namely
(
bi, v
+
i
)
,
(
b+i , vi
)
, and
(
b+i , v
+
i
)
, can only increase the revenue by Proposition 2. Hence we
have the following result.
Theorem 1 In a refined equilibrium of Sort-Cut, revenue is bounded below by the revenue
of Sort-Cut with truthful revelations.
Proof. Consider any refined equilibrium of Sort-Cut. Let b−i and v
−
i denote understating
the types, and b+i and v
+
i denote overstating the types (with respect to true types). We know
that
(
b−i , vi
)
,
(
bi, v
−
i
)
,
(
b−i , v
−
i
)
, or
(
b−i , v
+
i
)
do not occur. Additionally,
(
b+i , v
−
i
)
could only
occur for the current cut-point bidder, and by Proposition 7, if we change it back to (bi, vi) ,
revenue cannot increase. Finally, the rest of the bidders are either bidding truthfully or using
(
bi, v
+
i
)
,
(
b+i , vi
)
, or
(
b+i , v
+
i
)
. In any case, changing their bid to their truthful values cannot
increase the revenue. Therefore revenue in a refined equilibrium of Sort-Cut is not smaller
than revenue of Sort-Cut with truthful revelations.
3.3 Near Pareto Optimality
Among different efficiency concepts that could be considered, we consider that of Pareto
optimality: we say that an allocation is Pareto optimal if there is no other allocation in
which all players (including the auctioneer) are better off and at least one player is strictly
better off.8 In this setup, Dobzinski et al. (2008) has shown that Pareto optimality is
equivalent to a “no trade” condition: an allocation is Pareto efficient if (a) all units are
sold and (b) a player get a non-zero allocation only if all higher-value players exhaust their
budgets. In other words, an allocation is Pareto optimal when, given the true value of the
8Maximizing social welfare dictates all items to be allocated to the bidder with the highest value, even
if this bidder has a very small budget. We follow Dobzinski et al. (2008) and consider Pareto optimality as
the appropriate efficiency concept.
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partial winner, winners and losers are ordered in the right way: all winners have higher
values and all losers have lower values.
The previous subsection demonstrated that Sort-Cut has good revenue properties. The
following result pertains to the efficiency (near Pareto optimality) of the equilibria of Sort-
Cut. It shows that in any ex-post Nash equilibrium of Sort-Cut, the full winners and losers
are ordered in the right way given the announced value of the partial winner.
Theorem 2 Consider any ex-post Nash equilibrium of Sort-Cut where vj is the announced
value of the partial winner j. Every bidder i 6= j who has a true value vTi > vj is a full
winner, and every bidder i 6= j who has a true value vTi < vj is a loser in this equilibrium of
Sort-Cut.
Proof. First, consider a bidder i whose value is vTi > vj . We prove that she must be a full
winner in equilibrium. Assume for the sake of contradiction that bidder i is a loser, so her
utility is zero. If she deviates and bids vj + ε (for 0 < ε < v
T
i − vj) and her true budget, she
will become either a full winner or the cut-point bidder (otherwise revenue of Sort-cut will
decrease with this deviation, which is not possible because of Proposition 2). Obviously her
utility becomes strictly positive with this deviation (her price per unit is at most vj). We
thus reach the necessary contradiction to her individual rationality.
Now consider a bidder i whose value is vTi < vj . Assume for the sake of contradiction that
bidder i is a full winner. If bi is smaller than the unused budget of the cut-point bidder (s),
then she gets all items at a per-unit price vj , and hence she obtains a negative utility. If this is
the case, she would be better off announcing her true valuations to guarantee a nonnegative
payoff. If bi > s, then we argue that i would be better of by deviating to (vj−ε, bi) for small
enough ε. Let us first look at the limiting case in which i deviates to (vj, bi) and becomes
the cut-point bidder. After this deviation, the unused budget of i would be exactly s. The
allocation of original full winners will not change; bidder j will be getting s
vj
more items by
paying s more and bidder i will be getting s
vj
less items by paying s less. Therefore, bidder
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i’s utility increases by s
vj
(
vj − v
T
i
)
> 0 (in a sense by this deviation, bidder i is selling s
vj
units of the items to bidder j at the per-unit price of vj). By deviating to (vj − ε, bi), the
original full winners’ allocations would slightly increase; therefore bidder i’s utility increase
will be slightly smaller than s
vj
(
vj − v
T
i
)
.9 But for small enough ε, it will always be positive,
leading again to a contradiction.
This theorem establishes that given equilibrium cut-point value, all winners and losers
will be rightly placed. But since the cut-point bidder may be misplaced, this does not imply
full Pareto optimality. Consider the following example.
Example 1 There are 2 units of the item to be sold, and there are four bidders with budget-
value pairs (18, 19) , (1, 9) ,
(
17
9
, 8
)
, and (10, 1) . For this setup, it can be confirmed that bidders
announcing their types (budget,value) as (18, 19) , (1, 9) , (36, 18) , and (10, 1) constitute an
ex-post equilibrium of Sort-Cut. In this equilibrium, bidder 3 overstates her value and budget
and becomes the partial winner. Although the full winners and the losers are rightly ranked
according to the announced value of the partial winner, the allocation is not Pareto optimal.
Bidder 3 gets a positive allocation even though bidder 2 has a higher value and zero allocation.
As an aside, note that the revenue of Sort-Cut in this ex-post equilibrium is 18 while the
revenue with truthful types is 18 + 17
9
.
4 Market Clearing Price Mechanism and Sort-Cut
In this section we compare Sort-Cut with the well-known Market Clearing Price Mechanism
(MCPM). MCPM is a mechanism that sells m items to all interested bidders at a fixed
price. That is, in MCPM all items are sold p dollars per unit and all bidders whose values
are strictly greater than p spend all their budgets to buy these items (the bidders with values
equal to p could be partially spending their budgets to clear the supply).
9There is an implicit continuity assumption here. However, it is not difficult to show that utilities of the
bidders are continuous in type announcements.
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Definition 7 The Market Clearing Price Mechanism is an m-Procedure cut mechanism with
fixed pricing rule, α (y) = p∗ for all y ≥ 0 where p∗ satisfies vj ≥ p
∗ > vj−1.
One can easily argue that there will be a unique p∗. Consider a fixed pricing rule α (y) = p∗
that satisfies the above definition. Then for any fixed pricing rule α (y) = p with p > p∗, we
have p > vj (for vj defined by α (y) = p); and for any p < p
∗, we have p ≤ vj−1 (for vj−1
defined by α (y) = p).
Although it is a natural mechanism, as we demonstrate below, MCPM lacks good incen-
tive properties.
Proposition 8 Under the MCPM, overstating budget or value is weakly dominated by bid-
ding true types, i.e, for bidder i with type (bi, vi), announcing
(
b+i , vi
)
,
(
bi, v
+
i
)
, and
(
b+i , v
+
i
)
are all weakly dominated by (bi, vi).
Proof. Consider bidder i with type (bi, vi) who announces her type truthfully.
• If she is a full winner, she is indifferent to announcing v+i and would be strictly worse
off by announcing b+i (she would either get negative payoff by staying a full winner or
will get zero utility by becoming a partial winner or a loser).
• If she is a partial winner, since overstating her value or budget can only increase the
market clearing price p∗, she never can obtain a strictly positive payoff by deviating to
v+i or b
+
i .
• If she is a loser, by overstating her value or budget, she may become a winner, but the
market clearing price after deviation is going to be greater than the previous market
clearing price and hence greater than her value.
However, understating her value or budget in general can be beneficial. Consider the
following example.
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Example 2 Consider two bidders with (budget,value) pairs (16, 10) and (8, 9) where the
supply is m = 3. Under truthful report of types, the market clearing price is p∗ = 8. However,
if bidder 1 understates her value as 7, the new market clearing price will be 7 with the first
bidder spending 13 of her budget for an allocation of 13
7
units. Her new payoff is (10− 7) 13
7
∼=
5.57 versus (10− 8) 2 = 4, which shows that her understatement of value is a profitable
deviation. Similarly, if bidder 1 understates her budget as 10, the new market clearing
price will be 6 with the first bidder spending 10 of her budget for an allocation of 10
6
units.
Her new payoff is (10− 6) 10
6
∼= 6.67, which shows that her understatement of budget is a
profitable deviation. In fact, for this example an ex-post equilibrium is when bidders announce
their types as
(
2700
361
, 10
)
,
(
2430
361
, 9
)
, which brings only a revenue of 14.21 (in comparison with
truthful revenue of 24.)
The above discussion illustrates that the revenue from an (undominated) ex-post equi-
librium of MCPM is bounded above by the revenue of MCPM with truthful revelations.
Next, we obtain a lower bound for the revenue of Sort-Cut. For any announcements (b,v) ,
we show that the revenue difference between MCPM and Sort-Cut is at most equal to the
maximum budget of the players. For the same announcement of the types, since Sort-Cut’s
pricing function for the winners decreases in winners’ budgets, whereas MCPM’s pricing is
constant, MCPM’s revenue would be higher than the revenue of Sort-Cut. However, the
following proposition shows that the difference in revenues is bounded above by the maxi-
mum of the winners’ budgets. Let RM (b,v) denote MCPM’s revenue and bmax denote the
maximum budget of the bidders.10
Proposition 9 For any announcements (b,v) , RM (b,v)− RS (b,v) ≤ bmax.
Proof. Given (b,v) , let Sort-Cut’s cut point be denoted by c∗, and let MCPM’s cut point
(fixed price) be denoted by c∗∗. We argue that c∗∗ − c∗ ≤ bmax. By the definition of MCPM,
c∗∗ = m × p∗ where p∗ satisfies vj ≥ p
∗ > vj−1 and vj is the partial winner in MCPM.
10bmax can also be taken as the maximum budget of the full winners.
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Since c∗ ≤ c∗∗, j cannot be a full winner in Sort-Cut. If she is a partial winner, then
c∗∗ − c∗ ≤ bj ≤ bmax holds since the difference between c
∗∗ and c∗ is smaller than bj . If j is
a loser in Sort-Cut, then we argue as follows. At least one of the winners of Sort-cut has
to pay at most p∗ per unit (otherwise the revenue of Sort-Cut has to be greater than c∗∗).
Now, this bidder’s budget has to be greater than c∗∗ − c∗, because otherwise her price per
unit cannot be smaller than p∗. Hence, c∗∗ − c∗ ≤ bmax.
Proposition 9, together with proposition 1, establishes the following result.
Theorem 3 Let us denote the revenue of MCPM with the truthful revelation of types by R∗.
Then the revenue of any refined equilibrium of Sort-Cut is not lower than R∗ − bmax.
Unlike Sort-Cut, we next show an example where MCPM obtains a revenue that is an
order of magnitude (as the number of bidders) lower than R∗.
Example 3 Consider two types of bidders with budget, value pairs (b0, v0) = (16, 18) and
(b1, v1) = (8, 9); our basic example has one bidder of each type with a supply of m = 3 units.
Under truthful reports of budgets and values, the market-clearing price is p = 8. Let us look
for an ex-post equilibrium, in which the announcements are (a0, 18) and (a1, 9) . The pair of
values a0 and a1 solve the optimization problems of max(vi − p)
ai
p
for i = 0, 1 where p is the
market clearing price for the given announcements and supply. In our case p = a0+a1
3
.
Thus the optimization problem becomes max f(ai) =
3viai
ai+a1−i
− ai. Taking derivatives, we
get f ′(ai) =
3via1−i
(a1+a1−i)2
−1, with f”(ai) < 0. Solving the pair of first-order equations by setting
f ′(a0) = f
′(a1) = 0, we get a1 = 6 and a2 = 12 for a market clearing price of 6. The total
revenue of this equilibrium is therefore 18 compared to R∗ = 24.
If we now scale the example to have N bidders of each type and a supply of 3N , we may
assume that all the optimal budget announcements of each type of bidder are the same by
symmetry. The clearing price stays unchanged at p = N(a0+a1)
3N
= a0+a1
3
. The optimization
problem for determining each ai remains identical, giving the same solutions as before.
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However, the revenue now is 16N compared to R∗ = 24N and is thus a whole third less
than R∗, while by Theorem 3, Sort-Cut’s revenue in a refined equilibrium is not smaller than
24N − 16.
5 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we have introduced a mechanism to sell m divisible units to a set of bid-
ders with budget constraints. In this practically important setting, where a mechanism
that is simultaneously truthful and Pareto optimal is precluded, our mechanism, Sort-Cut,
achieves good incentive, revenue, and efficiency properties. Specifically, in Sort-Cut, (i) there
are profitable deviations from truthful revelations of types, but these can only happen in
a revenue-increasing way; (ii) in a refined ex-post equilibrium, the revenue of Sort-Cut is
bounded below by R∗ − bmax, and (iii) the equilibrium allocation is nearly Pareto efficient
in the sense that full winners and losers are ordered in the right way given the announced
value of the partial winner. We then compare Sort-Cut to a well-known mechanism, Mar-
ket Clearing Price Mechanism (MCPM). We show that in MCPM, (i) revenue increasing
deviations are dominated, and (ii) the revenue can be much smaller than R∗ − bmax.
There are many ways our work can be generalized. In the context of online advertisement
auctions, our model can be interpreted as “there is a single sponsored link that gets m clicks
a day and there are n advertisers.” However, in reality, there are many sponsored links. In
generalized second-price auctions studied by Edelman et al. (2007), the winner of the best
item (first sponsored link) is charged the bid of the second-best item, the winner of the
second-best item is charged the bid of the third-best item, and so on. In this environment
there are no budget constraints and the second-highest bid is always the competitor of the
highest value. The idea of Sort-Cut can be applied in this setup with budget constraints.
More specifically, it would be interesting to consider a model in which there are budget-
constrained bidders and multiple slots available for a query (in which an advertiser cannot
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appear in more than one slot per query).
In our model, we consider a setting of hard budget constraints in which the bidders
cannot spend more than their budgets. Extending our results to a soft-budget problem in
which bidders are able to finance further budgets at some cost is a promising direction.
One can model this kind of soft-budget constraint as specifying value per-click up to some
budget, then specifying a smaller value per-click up to some other extra budget, and so on.
By replicating a bidder into as many copies as the number of pieces in her value/budget
function, and allowing them all to participate in our mechanism, it seems reasonable that
we may preserve some of the desirable properties of Sort-Cut.
One very important extension is to consider the environment of multi-item auctions with
budget constraints. Again consider advertisement department of a computer manufacturer,
who this time wants to appear in a search engine’s queries for “laptops” and “desktops.”
This advertisement department might have a total budget to allocate between all online ads
and their per-click values for different items might be different. For instance one firm might
have higher per-click values for desktops, but lower per-click values of laptops, as compared
to a second firm. Designing an allocation and pricing rule that would have good efficiency
and revenue properties for this setup is very challenging. Devanur et al. (2002) provided
an algorithm for finding “market clearing prices.” This mechanism, however, lacks good
incentive properties. Bidders would have an incentive to understate their budgets, thereby
decreasing the prices. The extension of Sort-Cut to this setting is not straightforward, since
how bidders will want to split the budgets between different items would depend on the
pricing rule of each of these items, which in turn depends on the budget splits. Bidders’
effective valuations for different goods are given by the ratios of “per-click values and the
average prices” of different items. This multi-item extension seems to be the most important
yet also the most challenging extension of our model.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
First, note that x (αc, b) is weakly increasing in c : since α is nonincreasing, for c′ ≥ c ≥ 0,
we have αc
′
(y) = α (y + c′) ≤ α (y + c) = αc (y) , and hence
x
(
αc
′
, b
)
=
∫ b
0
1
αc
′ (y)
dy ≥
∫ b
0
1
αc (y)
dy = x (αc, b) .
Also, obviously x (αc, b) is strictly increasing in b.
Now, we can show that X (c, (b,v)) is strictly increasing in c. Consider c′ > c ≥ 0; we
have
X (c, (b,v)) =
(∑j−1
i=1
x (αc, bi)
)
+ x
(
αc+s, bj − s
)
where j satisfies c ≤
∑j
i=1 bi and c >
∑j−1
i=1 bi (and s =
∑j
i=1 bi− c). For c
′ > c, we can have
one of the two cases: either j is the same or j is bigger.
If j is bigger, then we have
X (c′, (b,v)) >
∑j
i=1
x
(
αc
′
, bi
)
≥
(∑j−1
i=1
x (αc, bi)
)
+ x
(
αc
′
, bj
)
> X (c, (b,v))
This is because x
(
αc
′
, bi
)
≥ x (αc, bi) for all i = 1, .., j−1 and x
(
αc
′
, bj
)
> x (αc+s, bj − s)
since c′ > c + s.
If j is the same (if c′ < c+ s), then we have
X (c′, (b,v)) =
(∑j−1
i=1
x
(
αc
′
, bi
))
+ x
(
αc
′+s′, bj − s
′
)
>
(∑j−1
i=1
x (αc, bi)
)
+ x
(
αc+s, bj − s
)
= X (c, (b,v))
where s′ =
∑j
i=1 bi − c
′ < s. This is because x
(
αc
′
, bi
)
≥ x (αc, bi) for all i = 1, .., j − 1 and
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x
(
αc
′+s′, bj − s
′
)
> x (αc+s, bj − s) since c
′ + s′ = c+ s and bj − s
′ > bj − s.
Next, we show that X (c, (b,v)) is continuous in c. By definition, x (αc, b) is continuous
in c and b (this is because x (αc, b) =
∫ b
0
1
α(y+c)
dy and is continuous in c and b even when α
is not a continuous function). Moreover,
X (c, (b,v)) =
(∑j−1
i=1
x (αc, bi)
)
+ x
(
αc+s, bj − s
)
.
If c increases from c to c + ε, j changes only when s = 0. If s 6= 0, then X (c, (b,v)) is
obviously continuous in c as all of the terms in the summation are continuous in c. If s = 0,
then
X (c+ ε, (b,v)) =
(∑j
i=1
x
(
αc+ε, bi
))
+ x
(
αc+ε+s
′
, bj+1 − s
′
)
and this goes toX (c, (b,v)) as ε goes to zero. This is because
∑j
i=1 x (α
c+ε, bi)→
∑j
i=1 x (α
c, bi) =
X (c, (b,v)) and x
(
αc+ε+s
′
, bj+1 − s
′
)
→ 0 since s′ → bj+1.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider bidder i with announced type (bi, vi) .
• First, we show that revenue is nondecreasing in budgets. Consider bidder i who de-
creases her budget to b−i < bi.We show that revenue cannot increase with this deviation.
– If bidder i was originally a loser by announcing (bi, vi) , then she cannot become a
winner or partial winner by deviating to b−i < bi. This is because by this deviation,
the pricing function for everybody becomes better and winners pay less per unit.
Therefore the revenue cannot increase.
– Next, consider bidder i who is a partial winner by bidding bi. If bidder i deviates
to b−i and becomes a loser, then the revenue has to decrease since the set of losers
becomes larger with this deviation. If she deviates to b−i and remains a partial
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winner, since all winners’ pricing gets better, the revenue has to decrease. If she
deviates to b−i , she cannot become a full winner. If this were the case, the pricing
function for every (full or partial) winner gets better, and then the total number
of units allocated will be greater than m.
– Lastly, consider bidder i who is originally a winner by announcing (bi, vi). If she
deviates to b−i and if she becomes a loser or a partial winner after the deviation,
then the revenue clearly decreases. This is because the set of full winners before
the deviation is a strict superset of the set of full winners after the deviation.
Now consider the case where bidder i deviates to b−i and remains a winner. Let us
denote bi− b
−
i by ∆. Suppose that the initial cut point is c and the new cut point
after the deviation is c′. Let α be the n-piece step function defined by (b,v) . Note
that the initial revenue is c and the new revenue is c′. We will show that c ≥ c′.
Since i has understated her budget, there will be a shortage of demand and the
pricing of all original winners will be better. Therefore, with this deviation, all
original winners except i will be allocated (weakly) more units of the object.
Assume for contradiction that c′ > c. This means that there will be new winners
who use an extra budget strictly greater than ∆, say ∆′. We now argue that the
extra units allocated to these new winners have to be greater than the number of
units i is giving up with the deviation. Extra units allocated to new winners are
priced at the values starting from the new cut point c +∆′ (according to (b,v))
and the total budget used is ∆′. The number of units i is giving up are priced
at the values in the range of c to c + ∆ < c + ∆′ and the total budget used is
∆. Since extra units are given with higher budget (∆′ > ∆) and lesser prices
(c+∆ < c+∆′) than the units given up, we conclude that with the assumption
c′ > c, the total number of units allocated has to be strictly greater than m, which
is a contradiction.
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We can present this argument more formally. Consider the case in which ∆ is
small enough so that the original partial winner j remains a partial winner. All
full winners k 6= i with k < j will be allocated more items since j will be using
more of her budget after the deviation. Let us consider the difference between the
total amounts allocated to bidders i and j before and after the deviation. Bidder
i’s allocation is decreased by
A ≡ x (αc, b)− x
(
αc+∆
′
, b−∆
)
since
x
(
αc+∆
′
, b−∆
)
> x
(
αc+∆
′
, b−∆′
)
.
We have
A < x (αc, b)− x
(
αc+∆
′
, b−∆′
)
= x (αc,∆′) .
On the other hand, bidder j’s allocation is increased by
B ≡ x
(
αc+s, bj − s +∆
′
)
− x
(
αc+s, bj − s
)
= x
(
αc+bj ,∆′
)
since
x
(
αc+bj ,∆′
)
≥ x (αc,∆′)
we conclude B > A. The argument for the case when the deviation results in a
change of the partial winner is very similar but not illuminating. Thus, the total
number of units allocated has to increase after the deviation.
• Now, we show that revenue is increasing in values. Consider bidder i who increases
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her value to v+i > vi. We show that revenue cannot decrease with this deviation.
– First, if bidder i is a winner by bidding (bi, vi) and she deviates to v
+
i > vi, then
she remains a winner after the deviation, and the revenue does not change. This
is because Sort-Cut’s allocation and pricing rule is invariant to full winners’ values
(so long as they remain full winners).
– Second, consider a bidder i who is a loser by bidding (bi, vi) and deviates to
v+i > vi. If she remains a loser after the deviation, since the pricing function
for winners gets worse, the revenue has to increase. Let us now consider the
deviation which makes i a partial winner. If the partial winner becomes a full
winner after the deviation (v+i < vj where j is the original partial winner), the
revenue obviously increases with the deviation, since the cut-point has increased.
Let us consider the case in which v+i > vj ; i becomes a partial winner and j
becomes a loser after the deviation. Assume for contradiction that the revenue
decreases with the deviation. If this is the case, it can be seen that the pricing
function for all winners becomes worse after the deviation (total unspent budget
of price setters with vk ≥ vi becomes greater and some of the values increase).
Hence all full winners will be allocated less units of items after the deviation.
This implies that the number of units allocated to i after the deviation has to be
greater than the number of units allocated to j before the deviation. But again,
the pricing function for i after the deviation is worse than the pricing function
for j before the deviation. For i to be allocated more, her budget spent after the
deviation has to be greater than j’s budget spent before the deviation, which is a
contradiction.
Suppose i is currently a loser and deviates to v+i and becomes a full winner. We
can split this into two deviations. First, i deviates to v+′i > vj and becomes a
partial winner (which increases the revenue), then she deviates to v+i and becomes
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a full winner which will next be shown to increase the revenue.
– Lastly, consider bidder i who is a partial winner by bidding (bi, vi) . It is obvious
that she cannot become a loser after deviating to v+i . If she deviates to v
+
i and
remains a partial winner, then the pricing function for all winners get worse, hence
the revenue has to increase. If she deviates to v+i and becomes a full winner, then
we argue that revenue has to increase.
Consider the case where i is currently the partial winner, and she deviates to
v+i > vi−1 (where bidder i − 1 has the next highest value after bidder i) so that
i− 1 is the new partial winner and i is a full winner. Denote the original unused
budget of bidder i by s′i and after deviation, the unused budget of bidder i−1 by
s′i−1. It suffices to show that s
′
i ≥ s
′
i−1. Assume for contradiction that s
′
i−1 > s
′
i.
First, it is easy to see that the pricing function for all winners other than i or
i − 1 gets worse, therefore they will be allocated (weakly) less number of items.
Similarly to the previous discussion, we show that the total number of units
allocated to bidder i and i−1 has to (strictly) decrease after the deviation, which
gives us the desired contradiction. Bidder i− 1’s allocation is decreased by
x (αc, bi−1)− x
(
αc+s
′
i, bi−1 − s
′
i−1
)
which is strictly greater than
x (αc, s′i) .
Bidder i’s allocation is increased by at most
x
(
αc+s
′
i−s
′
i−1 , bi
)
− x
(
αc+s
′
i, bi − s
′
i
)
which is smaller than
x
(
αc+s
′
i−s
′
i−1, s′i
)
.
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Since c + s′i − s
′
i−1 < c, we conclude that the total number of units allocated to
players has to be strictly less than m, leading to a contradiction.
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